Abstract: In this paper, I consider a consumer with a concave utility function over n commodities and trace out the consequences of quantity constraints on product markets for the consumer's aversion towards income risk. I show that the e¤ect can be decomposed in a cardinal and ordinal term, that both terms may add up to a non-linear e¤ect on the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and that a severely rationed consumer may even become less risk averse then when unconstrained.
Introduction
A consumer facing an uncertain income prospect will evaluate this prospect in terms of the opportunities for using this income. These are de…ned by the prices of the di¤erent commodities she cares about, and possibly other market restrictions, like quotas. If the consumer is certain w.r.t. the terms at which she can trade, and if these trading opportunities do not change, then for the purpose of analyzing her attitude towards a risky income, it su¢ ces to work with the standard single argument Bernoulli utility function summarizing the optimal trading for any income level m.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the change in the consumer's willingness to bear income risk when her trading opportunities get restricted because of quantity constraints. Understanding the impact of such constraints is useful for two reasons. On descriptive grounds, a consumer may not always be successful in realizing her notional trades. Prices can be regulated or sticky on other grounds, requiring that available supply is allocated according to a quantity rationing mechanism-an example is health care in countries with a National Health Service. Also, many household services are derived from durable household goods which are purchased in lumpy amounts. Marginal adjustments of these goods are very costly, implying that a household is committed to a service ‡ow that may di¤er from the ideal amount. Understanding the consequences of such trading constraints on the willingness to bear income risks is required for correctly explaining and interpreting the variation in empirical measures of risk aversion (cf Barski et al. 1997).
Second, such an understanding is also useful to sharpen the normative arguments in favour of price rigidities. For example, it has been arguedsee Drèze and Gollier (1993) -that downward wage rigidities can implement second-best Pareto e¢ cient allocations when labour market contracts are incomplete. Compared with a situation with competitive spot markets for labour, these rigidities balance the gain in risk sharing e¢ ciency with a loss in allocational e¢ ciency. However, these arguments are made on the assumption that the employment status of a worker does not bear directly upon her willingness to accept risks. If it does, then the normative role of wage rigidities may need to be reexamined. agent who has to commit to an action before observing the lottery outcome. Gollier derives a set of su¢ cient conditions for the ‡exible context to lead to a higher risk tolerance. He then examines how rigidities may induce a household to more risk-prone behaviour in portfolio allocation and/or savings decisions. While both papers address a similar question, their focus is very di¤erent. Gollier's focus is on decision taking under risk: does the ability to postpone an action until the uncertainty is resolved always lead to more risk taking? In the present paper, I examine the e¤ect of one particular set of constraints-quantity constraints on purchased levels of goods and serviceson the willingness to accept small income risks, and decompose it in terms of consumer preferences. Section 2 gives a reminder of the consumer's decision problem, its properties, and the de…nition of her willingness to bear income risks. In section 3, I introduce quantity constraints and derive the consumer's aversion w.r.t income risks and its relation to her aversion when quantity constraints are absent. Section 4 looks at the 'second order'e¤ects of quantity constraints and shows, by means of examples, that these e¤ects may exceed the …rst order one. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
Income risk aversion without quantity constraints
A consumer cares about n commodities whose quantities are given by the bundle q 2 R n + . Let the price vector be certain and given by p 2 R n + : The consumer's income e m, however, is random with expectation m and variance 2 m . Her preferences are represented by a cardinal Bernoulli utility function u( ) which is monotone and strongly concave.
Suppose that the consumer is informed about the income draw before she makes her consumption decision. Suppose as well that the income draw coincides with the expected income m.
1 Her problem is then to solve
Let the unique solution be given by the bundle q(p; m) satisfying the …rst order conditions
where (p; m) is the equilibrium value of the Lagrange multiplier.
The local properties of q(p; m) are well known but repeated here for future reference:
(iv) Kp = 0, and (v) y 0 Ky < 0 for y 6 = p ( real scalar),
where q m stands for the vector of income e¤ects @q @m
. Expression (2-ii) is the Slutsky decomposition. A similar decomposition of the price e¤ect on the marginal utility of income, , is
The …rst rhs term is a real income e¤ect that can be neutralized by an appropriate change in income. The second rhs term is a substitution e¤ect: the change in the marginal utility of income when the consumer is compensated so as to remain at the same utility level (Silberberg, 1978 , pp 260-1).
The indirect utility function is de…ned as v(p; m) def = u(q(p; m)) and satis…es v m = (p; m). By assumption, the Hessian of u( ), u, has full rank. Then it can be shown (see, e.g., Barten, 1977 ) that
Using the adding-up and homogeneity conditions (2-(i) and (iv)), we get v mm = m = q 0 m um . Hence, the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, measuring twice the risk premium the consumer is willing to pay (per unit of variance) to get rid of the income risk, is given by 
(Weakly binding) quantity constraints
and that the consumer can no longer choose the sub-bundle z which is …xed at z. Her problem then turns into max
Let the solution be given by x r (p; m; z), satisfying the …rst order condition
The indirect utility function is now v r (p; m; z) def = u(x r (p; m; z); z). Repeating the procedure of section 2, the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion for income risk is given by
Rather than comparing x 
Implicitly di¤erentiating (7) and using the Slutsky equation (2-ii) shows that
Intuitively, the consumer would like to respond to a marginal income increase by dz = z m dm. However, the quantity constraint prevents her from doing so, and therefore the virtual price of that bundle has to go up with K 1 zz dz.
The marginal utility of income is then
where the equality sign follows from Roy's identity. Di¤erentiating one more time w.r.t. m yields
where the second equality follows upon using (3). Since 
Assume …rst that the quantity constraints z are weak, i.e., that they exactly coincide with z(p; m), the levels the consumer would have chosen if her income takes the expected value. Then z = p z and the …rst rhs term reduces to Since K zz is a negative de…nite matrix, so is its inverse. Therefore the quadratic form z This result can be explained as follows. Ideally, the consumer would like to respond to a small deviation in income, dm, from its expected value, by increasing the demand for z commodities with dz = z m dm. Since this is not feasible, the virtual price vector of z-goods increases with d z = K 1 zz z m dm. This price increase has a double e¤ect on the marginal utility of income:
The …rst e¤ect is the change in marginal utility because real income falls, while the second e¤ect is the compensated price e¤ect on marginal utility. The …rst e¤ect is eliminated, however, because the consumer's virtual income, m + ( z p z ) 0 z, is by de…nition adjusted with exactly zd z . Hence, the change in marginal utility due to the virtual price change is z The intuition for Proposition 1 comes about most clearly in the case where the utility function is quasi linear in one good, e.g., in leisure. Because preferences are quasi-linear, all exogenous income risk is then absorbed by leisure. Since also the utility function is linear in leisure, the consumer is risk neutral w.r.t. this income risk. But if she faces a binding quantity constraint on her labour supply, the exogenous income risk is absorbed by the consumption of other goods, whose marginal utility is strictly falling. Hence, the quantity constraint turns the consumer into a strictly risk averse person w.r.t. income risk.
Proposition 1 is a generalization of a result by Drèze and Modigliani (1972) . They considered a consumer deciding about the amount to save while facing an uncertain future income. They compared the attitudes towards income risk under two settings: (i) a timeless income risk where the consumer is informed about her income draw before making her savings decision, and (ii) a temporal income risk where the savings decision is made before the income draw is known. Drèze and Modigliani (1972, eq 2.9) showed that the risk aversion for temporal income risks exceeds that for timeless income risks by an ordinal term positively related to the (squared) income e¤ect on current consumption and reciprocally related to the degree of substitution between current and future consumption.
A similar relation between the coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion obtains by using the Rotterdam parameterization for the income and substitution e¤ects (Theil, 1976) . Using a^above a vector to denote the diagonal matrix with the vector as its main diagonal elements, we can write
De…ning the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion without and with quantity constraints as R(p; m) 
The next result (proven in appendix) shows that these measures of risk aversion w.r.t. income are monotone in the number of commodities subject to a quantity constraint.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the consumption bundle q is partitioned as (x; y; z). Then A(p; mjy; z) A(p; mjz):
Up til now, I have assumed that the quantity constraints are just binding, so that z = p z . In the next section, I relax this assumption.
Strictly binding quantity constraints
If quantity constraints are strictly binding, then i > (<)p i depending on whether the consumer's notional demand for commodity i exceeds (falls short of) the quantity constraint. The …rst rhs term in (11), which may be written as A(p x ; z ; m + ( z p z ) 0 z), then no longer coincides with A(p; m), and we need to account for the in ‡uence of z on this measure of absolute risk aversion. For simplicity, I focus in the remainder on the case where z is a scalar. Now (12) can be written as
where the superscript v denotes evaluation at the virtual price and income level, and m
The rhs is the inverse of the uncompensated price elasticity of the z-good. If z is a normal good, the rhs is always positive. The lhs is only positive when the quantity constraint lies below the notional demand for the z-good. Thus, with forced consumption, m m v > 1 and increasing. Forced consumption will then always make a consumer more risk averse. With rationing, m m v < 1 and possibly decreasing for su¢ ciently strong rationing. Strong rationing may turn the consumer into a more risk tolerant person then when unconstrained.
The following two examples show the behaviour of R(p; mjz) and its two components when preferences are given by a symmetric CES function over two goods (see the appendix for the derivations). In both examples, m = 10 and p x = p z = 1, so that the notional demand for each good is 5 units. In the …rst example, illustrated in …gure 1, = 2 and = 2. If the quantity constraint on z is less than 2.95 units, the consumer turns less risk averse than without facing any constraint at all. The …gure also shows that R(p; mjz) need not be monotone in z, and here the decreasing part is due to . Again, the ideal amount of the z-good is 5 units. Now, the non-monotone behaviour of R(p; mjz) is due to the ordinal term whose relative importance shrinks. If the constraint is just binding, R(p; mjz = 5) = 4:5, but it drops to almost 2.5 if there is forced consumption of two additional units. Figure 2 These examples illustrate that even with very 'regular'preferences (constant degree of relative risk aversion, homotheticity, a constant elasticity of substitution), quantity constraints have complicated e¤ects, except in the neighbourhood of the notional demand for the constrained good(s). Stated di¤erently, (income) insurance and the z-good can be both complements, as well as substitutes, depending on the level of the constraint.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown how quantity constraints on one or more goods or services have an e¤ect on the consumer's willingness to accept income risk. Using the virtual price approach, I have decomposed the e¤ect into an ordinal term that depends on the own price elasticities of the constrained goods, and a cardinal term that depends on the unconstrained degree of risk aversion. Numerical examples show that a rationed consumer may be less risk averse than without facing a quantity constraint, and that the relationship between the degree of relative risk aversion, and the quantity constraint can easily become very non-linear.
At a more general level, I believe these …ndings show that employment status of a worker/consumer, the imperfect malleability of durables, and transaction costs more generally, all may contribute to a person's willingness to bear risk, and not necessarily in a uniform manner. This suggests, e.g., the use of a ‡exible form for employment status when explaining the empirical variation in risk aversion measures.
